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1. Introduction 
Here, we are interesting in a class of derivatives with an 
enormous market volume known as the repurchase 
agreement, or repo [7]. The repo market is one of the 
important suppliers of the liquidity for bank institutions, 
finance corporations etc. while the central bank repo rate is 
one of the most significant finance indicators. 
In principal, the repurchase agreement is a collateral 
loan, and virtually any portfolio of securities can be used as 
the collateral. The available data on the repo rates usually 
concern the Treasuries repo, i.e. the repurchase agreements 
with a portfolio of Treasuries accepted as the collateral. 
Usually, under the repo agreement, borrowers find a short 
term supply of the least expensive liquidity, while lenders 
find the least risky investments of their funds. The 
described business model corresponds to the so-called 
general repurchase agreement, and the corresponding 
interest rate is called the general repo rate.  
The scheme of the repurchase agreement supports also 
other business models where the lender makes profit via 
short-term investments of the borrowed securities. Namely, 
if an investor expects a drop in the price of the securities, he 
might borrow the securities using the repo agreement and 
maintain a short position in the market. This kind of repo is 
called special, and the respective repo interest rate is called 
the special repo rate. 
The differences in the general and special repo rates are 
studied e.g. in [8]. A connection of the special repo and 
options was observed in [6] where the authors discuss 
strategic “fails” and explain differences between the rates in 
some particular forms of the special repo. In the empirical 
study of the term structure of the repo rate on the three 
separate repo markets based on the Treasuries, the agencies 
securities and mortgage-backed securities as collateral [12], 
it was shown that the measured variation in the repo rate 
comes from the collateral risk and is irrelevant to the 
counterparty credit risk. This is an important result for our 
model explained below. 
We also mention theoretical papers on various aspects 
of the repurchase agreement theory like the coexistence of 
the repo and direct sales [10], search price model [14] and 
the special repo rates [2]. 
The classical option pricing model by Black and Scholes 
[1], thanks to its relative simplicity and flexibility, is 
adapted to any kind of options and other derivatives and 
became a practical tool for many traders, hedgers and 
investors. It is widely believed that this model helped the 
option market to reach an extraordinary volume even 
though the Black-Scholes model predictions do not match 
the empirical market data [1], not saying it uses several 
non-realistic assumptions. Probably, this influence reflects 
mainly the people's need to have a simple and flexible tool 
to navigate in the uncertain market environment rather than 
the actual efficiency of the model in decision making [15]. 
Below, we connect the problem of the repo rate 
evaluation with the problem of the option pricing. We 
present an alternative to the Black-Scholes method of 
evaluation of the call-option price implied by the general 
repo agreement. We observe that our approach produces 
numeric results remarkably close to the figures computed 
using the Black-Scholes formula. We also relate the 
problem of the American put-option pricing with the 
evaluation of the special repo rate. 
2. Methods 
By definition, the interest rate is the rate at which a 
borrower pays a fee for the use of money owned by a lender. 
The variety of existing interest or discount rates is rather 
large and includes those on retail and corporate loans, on 
bonds and notes, on municipal and government securities, 
 
 
on reserves and excess reserves etc. The values of the 
interest and discount rates depend on the form of the 
borrowed asset, credit score of the borrower, loan duration 
and other aspects including overall economic conditions. 
Among the most important interest rates, we mention 
the discount rate of the Federal Reserve to depository 
institutions on overnight primary credits (recently, 0.75%), 
seasonal credits (0.15%) and on Federal Funds (0-0.25%). 
All these loans are fully collateralized. 
Another class of important interest rates is the yields of 
Treasuries. This year, the latter vary from 0.01% for 1 
month bills up to 3.6% for 30-year bonds. 
Finally we mention that this June the overnight Treasury 
general repo rate dropped to 0.12% that is lower than the 
Fed interest rate on seasonal loans for small and medium 
banks. 
Looking for simplicity (cf. [1]), in our subsequent 
analysis, we assume the perfect liquidity of the market and 
the absence of any transaction cost. We also assume that the 
parties of the transactions interpret the conditions of the 
agreement according to the prescribed business models and 
the possibilities provided by the market conditions. 
Formulating the business model and behavior of the 
participants, we mainly follow the study of the repo market 
by M. J.Fleming and K. D. Garbade [6]. 
Namely, the general repo agreements are interpreted as 
the collateral loans, and the decisions of the general repo 
parties closely follow the conventions of such kind of loans. 
Following [6], we distinguish the special repurchase 
agreement under the Federal Reserve supervision and the 
special repo between private corporations. In the first case, 
the specific Treasures demanded by the market are supplied 
by the Fed for a fee in the form of “bonds-versus-bonds” 
loan. Therefore the relevant repo rate is negative. In the 
second case, the private corporations delivering the specific 
securities, in contrast to the Fed, might fail not delivering 
the securities one or more days, and the corresponding 
special repo rate can approach the zero value but never 
becomes negative [6]. 
Theoretically, there is a possibility that the borrower of 
securities can fail not returning the borrowed specific 
securities at the agreed day. However, we were unable to 
find the empirical market data which could agree with the 
predictions of the corresponding model. 
The general idea underlying our analysis is the fact that 
any obligation assumed by an agreement but not supported 
by an appropriate contractual commitment can be avoided 
by either party. From the finance point of view, this fact 
manifests itself as if the party that interprets the obligation 
as the right has purchased an option written by the other 
party. Introduction of the options in the analysis of the 
typical business interactions allows us to describe their 
finance side in clear terms, e.g. to connect the repo rates 
with the option prices, avoiding a difficult study of random 
and chaotic processes, see e.g. [3]. Comparing the results 
achieved in this way with the empirical market data, it is 
possible to rule out unrealistic models and confirm other 
ones. 
3. Repurchase Agreement 
A financial arrangement is called repo (repurchase 
agreement) if a holder of securities sells them to a lender 
and agrees to repurchase them at an agreed future moment 
at an agreed price. 
Signing the repo agreement, the lender accepts a 
collateral risk while the borrower accepts the risk of not 
receiving its securities back at the closing leg since both 
parties retain the opportunity to “fail”. The lender even 
accepts the risk of not receiving the agreed collateral [6]. It 
is important that the default of either party of the repo 
agreement does not imply an appeal to a bankruptcy court. 
We also assume that the “fails” do not incur ancillary costs 
like capital charges [6]. 
In spite of the risk of default, the use of repo is massive 
[7] because it serves as a primary source of the least 
expensive liquidity in the financial markets. 
Sometimes, the demand on specific securities drives the 
repo rates to negative levels, see e.g. [6, 7]. The latter rates 
associated with the borrowing of securities instead of 
money are called special to distinguish them from the 
former general repo rates. 
To avoid all the unnecessary complications, we restrict 
our considerations to the one-period model. At the starting 
leg, all prices are known constants, while the forward prices 
and returns at the closing leg are understood as the random 
variables with the particular expectations and deviations. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Scheme of the repurchase agreement. 
 
Figure 2.  The transaction scheme of the general repo agreement. 
3.1. General Repo 
We are going to re-interpret the economic processes 
underlying the general repo agreement using the assumption 
that the behavioral patterns of both principal participants of 
the agreement follow particular models. 
The general repurchase agreement is initiated by the 
borrower of money who owns some securities in possession 
 
 
and looks for a short-term liquidity. The primary lender’s 
business is crediting, and the securities provided by the 
borrower serve as the collateral for the loan. 
The model of the collateral loan implies that the lender 
has no motivation to break the agreement while the 
borrower might claim a default under particular conditions. 
Such a situation admits an interpretation as if the borrower 
buys a European call-option for the securities provided as 
collateral. 
In formal terms, our convention on the general 
repurchase agreement is the following. 
The borrower of funds: 
1). at the starting leg, delivers the securities worth 0P  to 
the lender and receives 0 0(1 )cQ P h   in cash, where 
the discount 0c cH P h  is called haircut (we call ch  the 
haircut rate); 
2). simultaneously, the borrower receives from the lender 
the implicit call-option at the present price cH  and the 
strike price 1Q ; 
3). at the closing leg, if the market price of the securities 
becomes higher than the call-option strike price, i.e. 
1P Q , then the borrower pays 1 0Q Q  to the lender 
for securities worth P  (the implied call-option is 
exercised); 
4). at the same closing leg, if the market price of the 
securities is lower than the call-option strike price, i.e. 
1P Q , then the borrower buys the securities at P  in the 
market (the implicit call-option is out of money). 
The lender of funds: 
1). at the starting leg, lends 0Q  in cash receiving the 
securities of value 0 0P Q ; 
2). simultaneously, sells at cH  the implicit call-option for 
the same securities with the strike price 1Q ; 
3). at the closing leg, if the market price of the securities is 
higher than the strike price of the call-option, 1P Q , the 
lender receives 1Q  in cash and delivers the securities to 
the borrower of funds (the implied call-option is exercised); 
4). if the market price of the securities is less than the strike 
price of the call-option, 1P Q , the lender sells the 
securities at the spot price P  (the implied call-option is 
out of money). 
Because the final result of all the transactions above 
depends on the forward price of the securities at the closing 
day and therefore contains an uncertainty, the conventional 
definition of the repo rate Rr , 
1
0
1,R
Q
Q
r                     (1) 
does not reflect particularly important features of the 
agreement. Besides the general repo rate Rr , we introduce 
below the intrinsic yield Sr  of the collateral, the lender’s 
interest rate Lr  and the implicit call-option yield Vr . 
Let 0P  be the spot price of the securities at the starting 
moment 0t t . The forward price P  of the securities at 
the future moment 1t t  is a random variable with the 
mean value 0P P    and the standard deviation S . 
The intrinsic yield Sr  determined by the forward price 
0(1 )SP P r   is a random variable with the mean value 
Sr  ,  
0
1 0,S
P
P
r                      (2) 
and the standard deviation 0/Sr S P  . 
The discount (haircut) 
0 0 0cH P Q                  (3) 
imposed by the lender to reduce the collateral risk1, we 
interpret as the present price of the implicit call-option. The 
future revenue of the lender 
1min{ , }gM Q P                 (4) 
is a random variable with the mean value 1gM Q    and 
the standard deviation Mg . Define the interest rate Lr of 
the lender, 
0
1.gL
M
Q
r                    (5) 
The amount 0 0(1 )cQ P h   of the lent money and the 
mean value of the future lender’s cash in-flow gM   
determine together the mean value of the lender’s interest 
rate Lr  , 
1
0 0
1 1 .gL R
M Qr r
Q Q
 
              (6) 
The value of the implicit call-option at the closing leg is the 
random variable 
0gV P M                      (7) 
with the mean value 
1 0.gP M PV Q                  (8) 
                                                             
1A significant increase in the haircut index was observed during the crisis of 
2007-2009 [4]. 
 
 
The implicit call-option present price cH  (haircut) and the 
expected forward price P   of the securities determine 
together the mean value of the yield Vr  of the call-option, 
1.V
c
V
H
r                          (9) 
Manipulations with the above definitions allow us to obtain 
an identity relating the haircut rate 0/c ch H P  and the 
mean values of the rates Lr , Sr  and Vr , 
( ) .c V L S Lh r r r r                 (10) 
The definition of the mean value of the lender’s return rate, 
0(1 )g LQ rM                    (11) 
can be used to connect the present price of the call-option 
and the lender’s mean return. Namely, the left hand side of 
(11) is computed using the known probabilistic properties 
of P  and 1min{ , }gM Q P  at the closing moment. 
In the right hand side of (11), we have two unknowns, the 
present value 0c cH P h  of the implicit call-option 
presented in 0 0 cQ P H  , and the expected lender’s 
interest rate Lr  . 
At this point, we observe the following opportunities: 
1. Using one or another pricing model for the European 
call-option, e.g. the classical Black-Scholes formula, 
evaluate a particular value to ch and find a theoretical value 
to Lr  . 
2. Using a reasonable valuation to Lr  , find the option 
pricing formula for ch  alternative to the Black-Scholes 
formula. 
3. Collect market data on ch  and Lr  and try to construct 
an arbitrage strategy involving repo agreements and the 
traded call-options. 
The implementation of the first opportunity is 
straightforward, 
0
1,( )
g
L
c BS
M
r P H
                   (12) 
where ( )c BSH  is a theoretical present price of the 
call-option, e.g. the Black-Scholes price. 
To implement the second opportunity, it is possible to 
use for example a simple interest rate model based on the 
ergodicity property of the correlated assets, 
2, .rf Cr co sr C n t           (13) 
Here rfr  is the risk-free interest rate and   is the 
asset price volatility. In particular, if the asset price is 
strongly correlated with the security price with the return 
Sr  and the volatility S , then 
2
2
( ) .rf S rf
S
rr r r 

               (14) 
Finally, 0Q  (and therefore the discount 
0 0cH P Q  ) is determined by the equation 
0 2 2
,
1 ( )
g
g
rf S rf S M
M
r r r
Q
 
 

           (15) 
where 2 2( )
g g gM M M       is the dispersion of 
gM . Thus if one assumes that the forward price P  is a 
normally distributed random variable, then the present price 
cH  of the call-option is a function of 1Q , rfr , Sr   and 
gM
 . In the example below, we verify that cH  computed 
in this way follows numerically close to the price predicted 
by the Black-Scholes formula. 
Example 1. Consider the overnight repo with a collateral 
portfolio of securities characterized by the annual yield 
3%Sr   , annualized volatility 19%S   and the 
spot price 0 100000P  USD. Assume that the forward 
price P  is normally distributed, has the mean value 
0(1 / 360) 100008, 33SP rP      USD and the 
standard day-to-day deviation 360/ 1.0%S  . Then 
it is a straightforward computation that the repurchase price 
1 (1 3 / )360 97003.92SQ P    USD corresponds 
to almost the same mean value 97003.53gM   USD 
and the day-to-day volatility 0.015%
gM
  . Let the 
risk-free interest rate be 0%rfr  . Assuming that the 
lender accepts the above explained ergodic model of the 
interest rates, we find that the mean value of the lender’s 
interest rate, 
2 2( ) 0%
gL rf S rf S M
r rr r        , 
is almost zero. Thus the sum lent at the starting moment is 
1
0 (1 ) 97003.53g L gQ M r M         USD, and the 
discount (haircut) 0 0 2996.47cH P Q   USD (the 
Black-Scholes formula gives ) 299 .41( 6c BSH  USD). 
Finally, the corresponding repo rate is 0.14%Rr  . 
In the similar overnight repo with a reduced discount, 
letting 1 (1 2 ) 98005.39SQ P   USD, we compute 
 
 
97996.89gM   USD and the day-to-day volatility 
0.077%
gM
  . Thus the mean value of the lender’s 
interest rate is 0.018%Lr    while the haircut equals 
2003.16cH  USD (the Black-Scholes formula yields a 
little bit lower value, ) 200 .76( 2c BSH  USD). The 
corresponding repo rate equals 3.1%Rr  . 
The call-option prices cH  evaluated using (14) and (15) 
closely follow the Black-Scholes prices in a wide range of 
the volatility S  of the underlying securities and tend to 
slightly deviate from those as the strike price 1Q  
approaches the expectation value of the forward price P   
of the securities. 
3.2. Special Repo 
The specific business models determining the behavior 
of the participants of the special repo agreement [5, 6, 8] 
are extremely different from those in the case of the general 
repo: the lender of funds is typically a short-term trader who 
lends money to borrow specific securities needed to 
maintain or expand its short position against these securities. 
The borrower of funds is typically a dealer or a long-term 
investor who owns the required securities or is able to 
borrow them at a third party or at the Fed’s auction. 
The special repurchase agreement is initiated by the 
lender while the borrower might not be really interesting in 
cash but either observes an opportunity to get the liquidity 
at a reduced rate or has a kind of obligation to ease the 
stress in the market [6]. 
Theoretic determination of the special repo rate is far 
from straightforward because the principal business idea of 
the trader is to make a speculative profit from the short sale 
at a non-equilibrium market condition. 
Consideration simplifies when the lender of the specific 
Treasuries is the Federal Reserve while the borrower of the 
securities is a primary dealer. 
3.2.1. The Fed’s Auction and the Negative Repo Rate 
Interacting with the private corporations, the Fed has an 
upper hand and imposes particular conditions in the repo 
agreement to receive an interest. The overall repo 
agreement is composed as the “bonds-versus-bonds” loan 
with a fee determined in an auction. The fee expressed as 
percent per annum tends to the general repo rate, but can 
significantly deviate from this level [6] if the Treasuries 
supply is not sufficient. 
The latter empirical observation can be explained 
revealing the standard business process of the primary 
dealer. The dealer lends money at the general repo rate in 
the general repo market and pledges the received Treasuries 
as the collateral for the “bonds-versus-bonds” loan. The 
interest gained in the general repo market is used to cover 
the Fed’s auction fee. Thus the primary dealer maintains a 
neutral position on both the general repo and the Fed’s 
auction2. If the demand for notes is extremely high, the 
dealers can become less conservative pushing the fee above 
the normal level. 
The above plausible explanation however is not totally 
correct since the Fed’s fee structure is more involved, see 
(25) and (26) below, and can not be understood without 
taking into account an influence of the fourth party, the 
dealer’s client. 
It is shown below (see also [6]), that the negative rate in 
the “bonds-versus-bonds” repo auction is closely related to 
the fact that the Fed never fails to deliver the agreed 
specific securities. The risk of not receiving the required 
specific securities immediately returns the special repo rate 
to the positive values. The mentioned above tendency of the 
auction fee to approach the general repo rate can be 
observed if the clients of the primary dealers demonstrate a 
high enough demand for the specific securities and by this 
reason agree with the almost zero special repo rates. If the 
market looses a particular interest to the specific securities, 
the Fed’s auction fee drops to zero. 
3.2.2. Special Private Repo 
Consider now the case when both parties of the 
agreement are private corporations. Now it is possible to 
figure out two kinds of fails influencing our constructions. 
The first one implies that the borrower of funds (lender 
of the specific securities) never breaks the repurchase 
agreement while the lender (trader speculating against the 
specific securities) might hold on the short market position 
if the price does not fall sufficiently within the period of the 
repo (lender’s fail). 
The second kind of fails is observed when the borrower 
of funds does not deliver the specific securities to the lender 
at the starting leg receiving however the full payment 
(borrower’s strategic fail [6]). 
First consider the lender’s fail case. The special repo 
agreement is a combined transaction involving the purchase 
of the securities together with the European put-option 
written by the borrower. A simplified version of this model 
is described as follows. 
The dealer (borrower of funds): 
1). at the starting leg, delivers the securities worth 0P  to 
the lender receiving 0 0(1 )pQ P h   in cash where the 
premium 0p pH P h  is the fee for “specialness”; 
2). at the closing leg, the dealer repurchase the same 
securities worth P  spending the agreed amount 1Q  in 
cash; 
3). if the securities are not delivered by the lender at the 
closing day, the dealer reopens the long position at the spot 
                                                             
2 Below, we present the formula relating the Fed’s auction fee and the repo 
rates. 
 
 
price3 P . 
The trader (lender of money) 
1). at the starting leg, lends 0 0(1 )pQ P h   in cash to 
the investor (borrower) where 0p pH P h  is the present 
price of the implicit European put-option with the strike 
price 1Q ; 
2). receives the specific securities worth 0P ; 
3). opens a short market position selling the securities at the 
spot price 0P ; 
4). at the closing leg, if the price P  satisfies the inequality 
1P Q , buys the securities at the spot price P  and 
delivers them to the borrower receiving 1Q  in cash (i.e. the 
implicit put-option is exercised); 
5). if the price P  is too high, 1P Q , then the lender 
extends its short market position (the implied put-option is 
out of money). 
The special repo rate is defined as 
1
0
1.sR
Q
Q
r                 (16) 
However computing the interest of the lender, we have 
to take into account its speculative profit from the short 
market trade, the principal reason to borrow the specific 
securities. 
The forward price P  of the securities is a random 
variable with the mean value P   and the volatility S . 
Its intrinsic yield is also a random variable with the mean 
value Sr   satisfying the conventional equation 
0(1 )SPP r      . 
Define the expense of the borrower at the closing leg, 
1max{ , }.sM Q P               (17) 
The trader’s net cash out-flow at the starting leg is pH , 
while the net cash in-flow at the closing leg equals to the 
value W  of the put-option, 
1max{ ,0}.s QW M P P        (18) 
Thus the trader’s return rate is the return rate of the 
put-option, 
1.sL
p
W
H
r                   (19) 
Example 2. Consider the overnight special repo 
collateralized by the specific securities with the annual yield 
                                                             
3 Conventionally, the delivery rescheduled to the next day at the same price [2]. 
However we assume that the agreement is terminated without any further 
consequences. 
3%Sr   , annualized volatility 19%S   and the spot 
price 0 100000P  USD. Assume that the forward price 
P  is normally distributed, has the mean value 
0(1 / 360) 100008, 33SP rP      USD and the 
day-to-day volatility 360/ 1.0%S  . Assume that the 
risk-free rate 0%rfr  . Letting the repurchase (strike) 
price 1 100008.33PQ    USD, the Black-Scholes 
formula gives the present value of the European put-option, 
( 403.69)p BSH  USD, thus determining the lent sum 
0 100403.69Q  USD. The repo rate is negative, 
142%sRr   , in spite of the total lender’s expected profit 
is positive, 399.53sW M P         USD. 
However we could not find reports on the actual market 
data with the values of the special repo rates comparable 
with the figure in Example 2. Perhaps, the dealers simply do 
not allow their customers (traders) to hold the short 
positions indefinitely long for free. 
Turn now to the borrower’s fail case. Similarly to the 
previous one, the typical borrower of funds is a dealer 
providing the customer (lender) with various services 
including the securities supply. As it is explained in [6], the 
market convention implies that if the borrower (lender of 
collateral) fails to deliver the agreed securities at the 
starting day of repo, then the agreement closes the same 
day but the borrower still owes the agreed interest to the 
lender for the full period of repo even though the lent sum is 
returned immediately. However if the special repo rate falls 
to zero, the dealer can borrow money for free while the 
lenders get stuck involuntary financing the dealer’s short 
position for the period of the repo [6]. 
If the dealer does not own the required specific 
securities, then his affairs besides the special repo 
agreement with the trader might involve the general repo 
with the third parties and the special repo auction under the 
Fed’s supervision. 
For instance, the dealer starts borrowing money at the 
special repo rate promising to deliver the specific securities. 
Then it lends the borrowed cash at the general repo market 
receiving the general Treasuries as collateral. Both the 
general notes and the received interest are used, 
respectively, as the collateral in the “bonds-versus-bonds” 
loan and as a fee in the Fed’s auction to borrow the specific 
securities. Next the dealer opens a short market position 
selling the specific securities and waits for a sufficient fall 
of the spot price. If the speculation ends successfully, the 
dealer closes its short position and delivers the specific 
securities to the client. At the closing leg, the dealer returns 
the borrowed money and the interest at the special rate to 
the trader and receives the specific securities. If the dealer’s 
short speculation fails, nevertheless, at the closing leg, the 
client receives the lent money and the interest. 
We interpret the dealer’s fail as the execution of an 
American style put-option written by the lender. No doubts, 
 
 
such dealer’s potentially profitable but unfriendly action 
eventually, but not immediately, leads to the deterioration 
of the client base [6]. 
Turn now to a simplified formal description of the 
dealer’s affairs: 
1). at the starting leg, the dealer receives from a client 
(short-term investor or trader) 0 0 pQ P H   in cash; 
here 0 0P Np  is the loan that has to be collateralized by 
N  specific notes at the spot price 0p , and 0p pH P h  is 
the haircut corresponding to the specific collateral; 
2). lends 0 0g cQ P H  in cash and receives general 
securities worth 0P  as a collateral under a general repo 
agreement where 0c cH P h  is the haircut for the general 
collateral; 
3). at the Fed’s special auction, borrows N  specific notes 
of the total value 0 0P p N  paying a fee 0F  in cash and 
leaving the general notes worth 0P  as collateral; 
4). sells N  borrowed specific notes for 0 0P Np  in 
the market; 
5). at an intermediate leg, if the spot price p  of the 
specific notes declines sufficiently, the dealer buys N  
specific notes in the market spending 
0 0pN P P p N   in cash; 
6). delivers N  specific notes to the client; 
7). at the closing leg, receives N  notes from the client and 
pays 1 0(1 )sRQQ r   in cash ( sRr  is the special repo 
rate); 
8). delivers N  specific securities to the Fed and receives 
the pledged general securities; 
9). receives 1 0(1 )g g RQ Q r   in cash ( Rr  denotes the 
general repo rate) and delivers the general securities to the 
third party. 
The dealer’s net cash-flow BC  during the special repo 
period is the sum 
,B rf rC C C               (20) 
where 
0 0 0,rf g R sRC FQQ r r          (21) 
is the interest obtained from the general repo, the interest 
paid in the special repo and the Fed’s auction fee, while 
0 ,rC P P                 (22) 
is the contribution of the speculative short trade. 
To avoid a financing from the other sources, the dealer has 
to take into account several liquidity conditions. 
The first condition, 
0 0 0 0,gQQ F                  (23) 
ensures the dealer’s ability to finance the borrowing of N  
specific securities at the Fed’s auction using the funds 
provided by the client. 
The second condition, 0 0( ) 0P pP p N   , 
allows the dealer’s to purchase N  specific notes at the 
spot price 0p p  during the special repo period. 
The third condition 
0 0 0 0 0g R sRP F Q QP r r      is sufficient to pay 
the agreed sum 1 0(1 )sRQQ r   to the lender at the 
closing leg. However, more conservative approach requires 
eliminating the speculative risk from the repo obligations 
imposing more restrictive condition, 
0 0 0 0.g R sRF Q Qr r               (24) 
The liquidity conditions (23) and (24) together, i.e. 
0 0 0 0 0min{ , }g g R sRQ Q Q r QF r   , determine the 
maximum fee the dealer can afford at the Fed’s auction 
spending the client’s money only. Using the relation 
0 0(1 )pPQ h  , this maximum value of the fee equals 
0 0max (1 ) .1
R sR
p
R
r rF P h
r
           (25) 
The corresponding Fed’s auction fee rate defined as the 
ratio 0 0/Fr F P  is computed as follows, 
(1 ) (1 ) ,
1 1
R sR R sR
F c p c p
sR R
r r r rh h h h
r r
r       
  (26) 
where 0/c ch H P  is the haircut rate for the general 
collateral. This value of 0F corresponds to the amount 0gQ  
lent to a third party at the general repo market, 
0 0
1) ,
1
(1 sRg p
R
Q rP
r
h          (27) 
and since 0 0(1 )g cPQ h   by definition, the above 
expression allows us to relate the general and special repo 
rates Rr  and sRr  with the general and special haircut 
rates ch  and ph , 
)(1(1 ) (1 .)(1 )sR p R cr hhr      (28) 
As we already know, the general repo rate Rr  and the 
general repo haircut rate ch  uniquely determine each other. 
Thus (28) can be understood as the relation between the 
three variables, the special repo haircut rate ch  and the 
special and general repo rates, sRr  and Rr . 
 
 
Consider particular implications of the above formulas. 
First observe that, as soon as the Fed’s auction fee is 
positive, 0 0F  , then, according to (25) or (26), the 
general repo rate exceeds the special repo rate, R sRr r . 
Second, the relation (28) between the special and 
general rates implies the expression for the special haircut 
rate, 
1 ,
1 1
R R sR
p c
sR sR
r r rhh
r r
          (29) 
or, equivalently, for the special repo rate, 
(1
.1
)R R
s
c
p
R
pr r hr h
h  

          (30) 
The latter formula implies the quite strong negative 
value of the so-called guaranteed-delivery repo contracts 
[6]. Indeed, let 0ph   that means the absence of the 
put-option in the dealer’s possession. Then (28) means that 
the Fed’s fee is quite substantial (in fact, largest possible), 
F cr h . At the same case, (30) yields the similar value to 
the special repo rate, (1 )sR R c Rr hr r   . Indeed, the 
general repo rate Rr  is much less than the haircut rate ch  
for the general collateral, thus approximately, sR cr h . 
The latter relations mean that, in the guaranteed-delivery 
case, the Fed’s fee is covered by the dealer’s client 
(short-term trader). 
If the delivery of the specific securities is not 
guaranteed then the lender does not enter into the special 
repo with the negative rate, therefore 0 sR Rr r  , that 
agrees with the empirical data presented in [6]. Moreover in 
the situation of a stress in the market for borrowing a 
particular note, the special repo rate falls to zero, 0sRr  . 
The corresponding specific collateral haircut rate 
approaches the general collateral haircut rate, 
(1 )p c R c crh h h h     , while the Fed’s auction 
fee in percentage rate almost approaches the general repo 
rate, (1 )F R cr r h  , again in agreement with the 
empirical data [6]. 
In the case of absence of any particular demand to the 
specific notes, the Fed’s auction fee is zero, 0Fr  , and 
(26) implies that the specific repo rate approaches the 
general one, sR Rr r . 
4. Discussion 
The above model of the general and special repo rates 
involving the call- and put-options is able to explain various 
phenomena observed in the repo market. This point of view 
also provides us with an alternative methodology of the 
option pricing or, conversely, of the repo rate evaluation. 
On the other hand, there are questions not answered yet, e.g. 
what is the repo rate model consistent with the 
Black-Scholes formula, or what are the implications of the 
above model on the macro-level. This moment, we are not 
ready to answer the first question. As to the second one, it is 
likely that the idea of the implicit options bought by the 
market participants from each other can be useful as a kind 
of measure of the relative degree of freedom which can be 
turned into a self-organizing macro-economic process. 
For instance, the apparently unfair situation associated 
with the dealer’s strategic fails, nevertheless, seems 
dynamically stable, cf. [6], indicating that the 
self-organizing potential in the system “dealer-trader” might 
extend beyond the conventional “service 
provider-customer” relationship. Indeed, one can imagine 
the system where the dealer, as an organizing center, 
identifies the goal of a speculative attack, provokes an 
initial stress in the market and a price movement. Looking 
for resources for the attack expansion and preparing the 
closure of his own short positions, the dealer invites the 
clients to join using the special repo machinery. It is known 
that the small traders usually wait for “trade signals” before 
stepping into the market, thus the uninitiated shocks often 
become unpredictable, unrecognized and even disastrous. In 
contrast, the trade signals reinforced using the clients’ 
resources and the special repo machinery can benefit all the 
attack participants (at the expense of unaware latecomers). 
5. Conclusions 
The above presented approach to the option pricing 
problem involving the repo rate analysis seems fruitful and 
promising. Indeed, on the one hand, it sheds a new light on 
various faces of the repo, and, on the other hand, provides 
us with the new opportunities in the study of the properties 
of the options. 
However, our simplified treatment of the business 
models associated with the repo agreements is in no way 
complete. Furthermore, the parameters of the actual repo 
agreements are not easy to retrieve, and our ability to proof 
the credibility of the above models is limited. Thus the 
presented remark on the repo-option relationships is rather 
the work in progress than the theory ready for applications. 
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